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Seniority and Business Mergers: The Union's
Duty of Fair Representation
The union's duty of fair representation was seen by last term's Supreme
Court as a "bulwark" in protecting individual workers from arbitrary
union conduct.' The importance of this protection to workers faced
with a business merger or an intra-company transfer was illustrated in
a recent District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals case, Truck
Drivers Local 568 v. NLRB,2 concerning the integration of seniority
lists following a merger of two trucking firms. There, the court affirmed
a National Labor Relations Board decision,3 finding a violation of this
duty when a union promised in a representation election that it would
favor its members over the employees of the acquired firm.
On the surface, the decision not only reiterated the Supreme Court's
faith in the duty of fair representation, but also represented a departure
from a policy of judicial restraint.4 A closer look reveals, however, that
instead of strengthening an individual's protection against the union's
bad faith,5 the decision merely underscored how feeble that protection
is. Essentially, the court of appeals' finding of a breach of the union's
duty of fair representation was a response to the blatant display of bad
faith on the part of the union.6 Where bad faith has not been so
I Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
2 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
3 Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1237 (1966).
4 Most courts, when confronted with a charge of unfair representation regarding the
merging of seniority lists, have chosen a course of non-intervention. "In deciding whether
a change in seniority arrangements involves fundamental unfairness, the courts have al-
lowed wide latitude for the give-and-take of collective bargaining and majority rule." Cox,
The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VL. L. RiEv. 151, 161 (1957). See Kahn, Seniority Prob-
lems in Business Mergers, 8 IND. & LAB. REL. RFv. 861, 364 (1955). But see Blumrosen,
Union-Management Agreements Which Harm Others, 10 J. PuB. L. 345, 368-72 (1961).
In sharp contrast to the non-interventionist attitude of the courts is the active participa-
tion of federal agencies in insuring that minority groups are protected in merger situations.
See Kent v. CAB, 204 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1953); Brown, Employee Protection and the Regu-
lation of Public Utilities: Mergers, Consolidations, and Abandonment of Facilities in the
Transportation Industry, 63 YALE L.J. 445 (1954); Kahn, supra note 4, at 365-71.
5 The term "bad faith" will be used often throughout this comment to indicate the
intent of a union to discriminate against a group of employees. As will be shown, the
courts, in litigation over merged seniority lists, have looked for bad faith only in the
union's conduct in reaching a solution, avoiding scrutiny of the solution itself. Examina-
tion of some of these solutions will reveal discrimination fully as egregious as that found
in Truck Drivers Local 568.
6 See notes 68-77 and accompanying text infra.
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blatant, or where courts have followed a non-interventionist policy to
extremes, the duty of fair representation has proved a meaningless safe-
guard to workers denied their seniority because of a union's political
decision following a business merger.
It is not difficult to see that business mergers7 cause serious internal
problems for the union. As the bargaining agent for these formerly
separate groups of employees," the union will be faced with one of
two situations. Either the job pool available will be diminished and
thus jobs lost, or the formerly distinct sets of employees will now simply
be under the same roof. In the first instance, the union must decide
which of the employees of the two firms or departments will get the
remaining jobs; in the second, it must resolve how seniority' will be
structured for the previously distinct groups.
Resolution of these problems can be determined in advance by the
collective bargaining agreement.'0 Generally, however, the employer
allows the union to determine the new seniority structure as it sees fit."
While at one time leaving such a matter in the hands of the union was
7 Mergers here refer to any form of amalgamation in which the entire assets of one firm
are joined with that of another, or where entire departments of the same firm are joined
together. A partial sale of assets is not considered a merger.
8 For the purposes of this comment, it will be assumed that the union is now the bar-
gaining agent for two or more groups of unionized employees, either through an NLRB
representation election as provided in the National Labor Relations Act § 9, 29 U.S.C.
§ 159 (1964), or that the same union was the bargaining agent for the employees previously.
For seniority rights in merging union and non-union employees, see NLRB v. Whiting
Milk Corp., 342 F.2d 8 (Ist Cir. 1965). For a general and occasionally helpful overview of
the problem, see Note, Seniority Rights in Mergers, 52 IowA L. Rxv. 95 (1966).
9 "Seniority" here will refer to competitive status seniority-layoff, hire, promotion-as
opposed to benefit seniority, which is concerned with employee fringe benefits and is
usually calculated by length of service. For a general discussion of seniority, see S. SLicmaR,
J. HEALY & E. LivERNAsH, THE IMpACT OF CoLcrnvE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 104-41
(1960); Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75
HAIv. L. R~v. 1535 (1962); Blumrosen, Seniority Rights and Industrial Change: Zdanok v.
Glidden Co., 47 MINN. L. REv. 505 (1963); Kennedy, Merging Seniority Lists, LAB. AR.. &
IND. CHANGE 1 (1963) (Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the National Acad-
emy of Arbitrators); Mater & Mangum, The Integration of Seniority Lists in Transporta-
tion Mergers, 16 IND. & LAB. RE.. REv. 343 (1963); Sayles, Seniority: An Internal Union
Problem, 32 HARv. Bus. REv. 55 (1952).
10 2 BNA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTs 201 (1964); U.S. BuRExu
OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. Nos. 908-11; COLLEcrvE BARGAINING PROVISIONS:
SENIORITY 47-50 (1949). Union constitutions are another source of solutions to these problems.
See SLICHTER, HEALY & LiVERNASH, supra note 9, at 131; Kahn, supra note 4, at 372; Mater
& Mangum, supra note 9, at 345-54. The duty of fair representation applies with equal
force in those cases where the merger of seniority lists has been settled in advance by union
constitution or by contract.
11 "Seldom does the company raise any serious obstacles, except to make known its con-
cern for employee equities and its desire to retain experienced workers." Sucmm, HELr
& LIvERNAsH, supra note 9, at 131. See Kahn, supra note 4, at 362; Mater & Mangum, supra
note 9, at 343-44; Sayles, supra note 9, at 55.
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arguably an unfair labor practice,12 it seems clear that such is no longer
the case.13
In making its determination, the union is confronted on the one
hand with the majority which has the political power, 14 and on the
other by its duty to represent the minority interest fairly.'5 It is this
tension between majority rule and minority interests that is central to
the problem of merging seniority lists. The courts' policy of non-
intervention has done little to discourage the unions' general response
of squeezing the minority16 and ignoring the ideal of fair representa-
tion.17
This comment will examine how the courts have resolved this tension
and try to establish guidelines through which the duty of fair representa-
tion, as applied to mergers and intra-company transfers, could be
strengthened instead of frustrated.
THE FRAMEWORK OF NON-INTERVENTION
Seniority rights are not inherent or vested,' 8 but are created by con-
tract 19 or occasionally by statute.20 As contractual rights, they may be
12 Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 887, aff'd sub nom. Teamsters Local
41 v. NLRB, 225 F.2d 348 (8th Cir. 1955).
13 Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 865 U.S. 667 (1961). Although this case refers specifi-
cally to the union hiring hall, the same would be true about seniority, i.e., the union's
control of the determination of seniority rosters is not a per se unfair labor practice. It
would be an unfair labor practice only if the union's control leads to discrimination.
14 The importance of having the majority power in determining seniority is well il-
lustrated by Sayles, supra note 9, at 57-60, and by Kennedy, supra note 9, at 40-41. That
employees will vote in their self interest is recognized in O'Donnell v. Pabst Brewing Co.,
12 Wis. 2d 491, 107 N.W.2d 484, 489 (1961), and In re City of Green Bay, 44 Lab. Arb. 311,
316 (1965) (Anderson, Arbitrator).
15 The duty of fair representation first arose under the Railway Labor Act in Steele v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 328 U.S. 192 (1944). That case involved racial discrimination by a
union in eliminating Negroes from certain railroad jobs. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 35 (1964); Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S.
892 (1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 30 (1958).
16 For instance, note the history of the Gulf-Sohio merger in Kennedy, supra note 9, at
40-41, or the history of the Pan American and American Overseas Airlines merger in Kahn,
supra note 4, at 868-71.
17 Exclusive bargaining agents may not "make agreements more favorable to the
majority than to the minority." Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 47 (1954),
citing S. RE'. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1985).
18 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 845 U.S. 30 (1953); Wagner Mfg., Inc. v. Cul-
bertson, 59 LR.R.M. 2599 (Ind. App. Ct. 1955). But cf. Zdanok v. Glidden, 288 F2d 99
(2d Cir.), cert. granted on other grounds, 368 U.S. 814 (1961). Glidden has come under
heavy academic fire by Aaron, supra note 9, and others, and is distinctly a minority view.
For a favorable review of the case see Blumrosen, supra note 9.
19 "Barring legislation not here involved, seniority rights derive their scope and signifi-
cance from union contracts." Aeronautical Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 37 U.S. 521, 526 (1949).
Colbert v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 206 F.2d 9, 13 (9th Cir. 1953); Elder v. New York
Cent. R.R., 152 F.2d 861, 364-65 (6th Cir. 1945).
20 Selective Training & Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 8, 54 Stat. 890.
Seniority and Business Mergers
altered by the union at any time.21 But although a union has the power
to determine or modify seniority rights, it must represent all its mem-
bers fairly.22 Determinations by the union which are arbitrary, in bad
faith,23 unfair, irrelevant, invidious, 24 political, 25 or racial 26 are viola-
tions of the duty of fair representation. Whether such conduct is an
unfair labor practice is as yet unsettled.27 Employees would appear, how-
ever, to have recourse to either the NLRB2 or the courts29 to enforce
this duty.
But while espousing a duty of fair representation and explaining its
content, courts have allowed unions "a wide range of reasonableness"30
in structuring merged seniority lists. Reasonableness, as interpreted
21 See O'Donnell v. Pabst Brewing Co., 12 Wis. 2d 491, 107 N.W.2d 484, 487 (1961);
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Note, Seniority Rights in Mergers, 52
IowA L. REv. 95 n.5 (1966).
22 See note 15 supra.
23 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
24 Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172
(2d Cir. 1963). In United Rubber Workers Local 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966),
the Miranda Fuel Co. doctrine--that a breach of its duty of fair representation was a
union unfair labor practice-was upheld.
25 Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 47 (1954); Ferro v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847, 851 (2d Cir. 1961); Mount v. International Bhd. of Locomotive
Engineers, 226 F.2d 604, 607 (6th Cir. 1955). Discrimination based on union membership is
also prohibited. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 US. 248 (1944); NLRB v. Machinists Lodge
727, 279 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1960).
20 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
27 Compare NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963), with Local 12,
United Rubber Workers Local 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966). In Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171 (1967), the issue as to whether or not a violation of the duty of fair representa-
tion is an unfair labor practice was the crucial difference that separated the majority and
concurring opinions. Justices Fortas and Harlan and Mr. Chief Justice Warren said
specifically that a union that breached its duty of fair representation committed an
unfair labor practice, 386 U.S. at 198, as did Justice Goldberg in Humphrey v. Moore, 375
U.S. 335, 351 (concurring). In both these opinions, the majority "assumed" such conduct
to be an unfair labor practice. For an excellent discussion of the issues in Vaca v. Sipes,
see Lewis, Fair Representation in Grievance Administration: Vaca v. Sipes, 1967 Sup. Cr.
REv. 81.
28 Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
29 See Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1964); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964). Under the Railway Labor Act, a fair
representation suit does not come under the jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board, but
can be brought into federal district court. Conley v. Gibson, 355 US. 41, 45 (1957).
30 Ford Motor Co. v. Hnffman, 345 U.S. 330, 838 (1953). The controversy here arose
over a seniority provision in the collective bargaining contract giving veterans credit
for pre-employment military service. The Court upheld the provision and, in so doing,
allowed unions broad power at the bargaining table: "Inevitably differences arise in the
manner and degree to which the terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual
employees and classes of employees. The mere existence of such differences does not make
them invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected.
A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in
serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of
1968]
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by courts and arbitrators, has included dovetailing,31 endtailing32 and
countless other intricate formulas. 3 This "wide range of reasonable-
ness" has provided the union with great discretion in two ways: first,
courts will assume compliance with the duty of fair representation
unless a bad faith motive or hostility can be shown,34 and second, courts
have at times used this "wide range of reasonableness" language so
broadly as to negate any requirement of fair representation.35
In effect, courts will not look at the substance of the union's deter-
mination until the plaintiff proves that the union has exhibited bad
faith. In the area of racial discrimination, the group discriminated
against is very visible and courts have little trouble in finding a union's
breach.3 6 In a nonracial context, however, the group is less visible and
proof of discrimination more difficult.37
purpose in the exercise of its discretion." Id. at 338. The powers extended to the union
at the bargaining table in Ford are also accorded it in the administration of the agreement.
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. at 351, 353-55 (Gold-
berg, J., concurring).
31 "Dovetailing" means to merge seniority lists using date of original hire with either
of the companies that are party to the merger. See Humphrey v. Moore and cases cited
at 375 U.S. 335, 347 n.10 (1964); Pratt v. Wilson Trucking Co., 214 Ga. 385, 104 S.E.2d 915
(1958); In re City of Green Bay, 44 Lab. Arb. 311 (1965); O'Donnell v. Pabst Brewing Co.,
12 Wis. 2d 491, 107 N.W.2d 484 (1961).
32 "Endtailing" means placing one group of employees at the bottom of the seniority
list of another group. See Bieski v. Eastern Auto Forwarding Co., 231 F. Supp. 710 (D.
Del. 1964), af'd, 354 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1965); Zeaner v. Truck Drivers Local 107, 234 F. Supp.
901 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Administrative Rulings of the NLRB General Counsel, 47 L.R.R.M.
1527 (1961) (Case No. SR-1114). But see Kahn, supra note 4, at 373: "To place all of the
employees from one list below those on the other list ... is really to reject integration."
33 In re Pan American World Airways, 19 Lab. Arb. 14 (1952) (Cole, Arbitrator) (two-
thirds weight to length of service, one-third weight to rank on original seniority list);
Kahn, supra note 4, at 3M3-78 (integration on basis of "distance" from first place on either
list; integration emphasizing status of employee in his former company); Kennedy, supra
note 9, at 5-34 (surviving group principle, absolute rank, follow-the-work); Mater &
Mangum, supra note 9, at 345-63.
34 "[Cjourts, unable to find standards by which to test the fairness of economic distinc-
tions in collective agreements, apply a heavy presumption of legality to union action."
Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal
System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1357 (1958). See Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound Lines, 303
F.2d 182, 185-86 (9th Cir. 1962); Cunningham v. Erie R.R., 266 F.2d 411, 417 (2d Cir.
1959); Colbert v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 206 F.2d 9, 13 (9th Cir. 1953); Pratt v.
Wilson Trucking Co., 214 Ga. 385, 104 S.E.2d 915, 916 (1958); Wagner Mfg. Co. v. Cul-
bertson, 59 L.R.R.M. 2599, 2603 (Ind. App. Ct. 1965); Markham v. American Motors
Corp., 55 L.R.R.M. 2757, 2760 (Wis. Sup. Ct. 1964); O'Donnell v. Pabst Brewing Co.,
12 Wis. 2d 491, 107 N.W.2d 484, 490 (1961); Administrative Rulings of the NLRB
General Counsel, 47 L.R.R.M. 1527 (1961) (Case No. SR-1114).
35 See NLRB v. Wheland Co., 271 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1959); notes 49-58 and accompanying
text infra.
36 See note 15 supra. Since the duty of fair representation first arose in a racial context,
some courts regarded only racial discrimination as being prohibited. Napier v. System
Fed'n No. 91, 127 F. Supp. 874, 892 (W.D. Ky. 1955): "In the absence of racial discrimina-
tion, no case has been cited.., where a court has upset an agreement because of chal-
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Even where discrimination is evident, courts may choose not to upset
the merged lists. Perhaps the most infamous litigation illustrating ju-
dicial non-intervention in seniority matters grew out of the absorption
by the Trailmobile Company of its wholly owned subsidiary, High-
land Body Manufacturing Company. 38 The employees of both com-
panies were represented by the UAW-AFL and were covered by the
same contract.3 9 The consolidation caused a dispute over seniority rights
in which the Trailmobile employees, who outnumbered the Highland
workers by ten to one, had sought to endtail the Highland group.40 By
consent of both groups, the dispute was certified to the International
Executive Board of the union for adjudication.41 The union ruled that
the once separate lists should be dovetailed. The Trailmobile workers
rejected this solution and called for a new representation election in
which CIO affiliation was voted by the disgruntled majority. A new
contract was negotiated endtailing the Highland employees and a
series of suits attacking the agreement ensued.
The basic issue of fair representation, however, was not met squarely
until six years after the first of these suits was brought.42 In Britt v. Trail-
lenged changes in seniority provisions." This view, of course, is erroneous. See generally
Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 CoLum. L. REv.
563 (1962); Winter, Improving the Economic Status of Negroes Through Laws Against
Discrimination; A Reply to Professor Sovern, 34 U. CI. L. REv. 817 (1967); Comment,
Racial Discrimination and the Duty of Fair Representation, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 273 (1965).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-h(6), strengthens the courts'
hand in preventing racial discrimination by labor unions. See Quarles v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 67 L.R.R.M. 2098 (E.D. Va. 1968); Comment, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination and
the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L. Ray. 1260 (1967),
37 Courts are apt to invoke the language of Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330
(1953). See, e.g., Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound Lines, 203 F.2d 182, 187 (9th Cir. 1962):
"That portions of an electorate will be dissatisfied with the result of an election is a fact
inherent in the democratic process and the principle of majority rule." This sort of reason-
ing makes employees charging unfair representation unattractive plaintiffs.
38 Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40 (1947); Britt v. Trailmobile Co., 179 F.2d 569
(6th Cir. 1950); Hess v. Trailer Co. of America, 31 Ohio Op. 566 (C.P. 1944); The Trailer
Co. of America, 51 N.L.R.B. 1106, 53 N.L.R.B. 1248 (1943).
39 The Trailer Co. of America, 51 N.L.R.B. 1106, 1113 (1943).
40 Cox, supra note 4, at 162.
41 51 N.L.R.B. at 1110.
42 The first suit, Hess v. Trailer Co. of America, 31 Ohio Op. 566 (C.P. 1944), pre-dated
Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., and so the issue of fair representation was not presented.
In a later suit brought by a member of the Highland unit under section 8(c) of the
Selective Training & Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 885, 890, providing that a veteran "shall
be so restored [to his job] without loss of seniority," the Supreme Court avoided the
question of unlawful discrimination by saying that it was not properly raised. Trailmobile
Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 50 (1947). Justices Frankfurter and Jackson dissented: "The
record indicates that [plaintiff's seniority rights] have never been terminated or modified
by good faith collective bargaining in the interests of the craft. It raises the suspicion that
they were simply misappropriated to the benefit of the majority group which was under
a duty to represent his interests as well as its own." Id. at 69.
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mobile Co.,43 the Sixth Circuit held: "Whatever we might think of the
fairness of the differentiation, the discrimination was in pursuance of
the bargaining process and not without some basis, forestalled a strike
and was therefore not invalid. 44
The result in Trailmobile has been criticized severely and often.45
Given the antagonism between the two groups, 46 the courts should have
required, at the very least, some showing of the reasonableness of the
union's decision .4 7The most, perhaps, that can be said for the Sixth
Circuit's decision is that, on policy grounds, the court chose industrial
peace over individual rights. 48 This is, however, a false choice, for the
dilemma is to maintain industrial peace while representing the mi-
nority interest fairly. Industrial peace, i.e., appeasing the majority, can
always be bought at the expense of the minority interest. The duty
of fair representation presupposes a reconciliation of the two, rather
than a choice. If the courts permit a union to destroy a minority's
interest on the grounds that "it forestalled a strike," the duty of fair
representation has been reduced to nothing more than rhetoric.
The Sixth Circuit was again faced with the problem of merged se-
niority lists in NLRB v. Wheland Co.49 There, the company decided
to consolidate its manufacturing division-consisting of a production
and maintenance unit of about 135 workers represented by the
Machinists, and a residual unit of about 25 represented by the Steel-
workers-with its ordnance division of 212 represented by the Allied
Industrial Workers. The consolidation was prompted by the curtailing
of the ordnance operations.
Allied submitted 206 newly signed authorization cards, solicited ex-
clusively from the former ordnance employees, and was recognized by
Wheland as the bargaining representative for the new consolidated
operation. Wheland and Allied entered into an interim agreement
providing that manufacturing division employees could be moved to
the consolidated plant, but that employees so moved would not replace
ordnance employees. Later, the two established a seniority list under
which employees formerly part of the manufacturing division would be
given credit for one year's seniority for each 2.6623 years actually
43 179 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1950).
44 179 F.2d at 573.
45 Cox, supra note 4, at 163; Wellington, supra note 34, at 1357; Comment, Duty of
Union to Minority Groups in the Bargaining Unit, 65 HIv. L. REv. 490, 499 (1952).
46 51 N.L.R.B. 1114.
47 Cox, supra note 4, at 163, makes a strong argument for endtailing under certain
circumstances.
48 See notes 78-80 and accompanying text infra.
49 271 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1959).
[Vol. 35:342
Seniority and Business Mergers
worked in the old division, while employees formerly with the ordnance
division would receive full credit for their past service. Overall employ-
ment was reduced from 375 to a little over 300.
The NLRIB found that Wheland violated sections 8(a)(1) and (2)
of the National Labor Relations Act50 by granting preferential seniority
to former ordnance employees on the basis of their membership and
past representation by Allied.51 By implication, the Board also found
that Allied had violated its duty of fair representation to the former
manufacturing employees.52
The Sixth Circuit reversed.53 The court concluded that the solution
to the seniority problem would "inevitably be unsatisfactory to some
employees" but in the light of Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls54 and Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman55 the decision "was not an invalid exercise of the
power conferred upon the respective negotiating parties."5 6
To say that the seniority roster would "inevitably be unsatisfactory
to some employees" was merely to state the obvious.57 The question,
however, is which employees are to find the solution "unsatisfactory"?
What should be the criteria? Here, the court recognized neither the
tension nor its resolution. The solution for the union was simple-
those who supported and belonged to Allied were given job prefer-
ence. It was nothing more than the majority exerting its strength over
the minority. Apart from the solution, however, the union exhibited
no manifestations of bad faith. The court here looked at form, dis-
regarded substance, and approved a scheme that was discriminatory
50 Sections 8(a)(1) and (2) refer to an employer interfering with the employees' rights
of self organization and their collective bargaining rights and to an employer attempt to
dominate or support a union.
51 The Wheland Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 814, 818 (1958).
52 120 N.L.R.B. at 819 n.7. Wheland seemed to anticipate the Board's Miranda Fuel Co.
holding. While specifically finding the employer guilty of an 8(a)(1) violation in
Wheland, the Board laid the groundwork for Miranda Fuel Co., which held that: "To
the extent ... that an employer participates in such union's arbitrary action against an
employee, the employer himself violates section 8(a)(1) of the Act." 140 N.L.R.B. at 185-86.
In Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1237, 1245 (1966), the Board saw Wheland
as a fair representation case.
53 The Wheland Co. v. NLRB, 271 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1959).
54 "An employee has 'no inherent right to seniority in service.'" 331 U.S. 40, 53 n.21
(1947).
55 "The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected....
Compromises on a temporary basis, with a view to long-range advantages, are natural
incidents of negotiation." 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
50 271 F.2d at 125.
57 Other such perceptive statements include one by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Brotherhood of R.R. & S.S. Clerks v. Girard Lodge 100, 384 Pa. 248, 259, 120 A.2d 523,
528 (1956): "When there are only five apples for six people, it is impossible for each
person to receive a whole apple."
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on its face and for which no other "reasonable" explanations were
advanced. 8
In Humphrey v. Moore,5 9 E&CL Transport Company's Louisville busi-
ness had been absorbed by Dealers Transport Company. Both groups
of employees were represented by the same Teamsters local. When
layoffs began at E&L, three E&L employees filed grievances claiming
that the seniority lists should be dovetailed. The national joint com-
mittee, after urging by the local president, supported dovetailing, and
since E&L's employees had generally greater seniority than those at
Dealers, the result was a large-scale layoff of Dealers employees.60
Several of the aggrieved Dealers employees brought a class suit in
state court alleging unfair representation. The case ultimately reached
the Supreme Court, where the dovetailed list was held valid.
The Court found that dovetailing "is a familiar and frequently
equitable solution to the inevitably conflicting interests which arise in
the wake of a merger or an absorption such as occurred here."6 1 Fur-
ther, it discovered "no substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or
dishonest conduct."62 In sum, the Court found that the union had
"acted upon wholly relevant considerations" and "in good faith and
without hostility or arbitrary discrimination."63
The difficulty with Humphrey v. Moore is two-fold. First, though
noting the fairness of dovetailing generally, the Court never explained
or analyzed why this method was substantively equitable, given the
particular facts of the case.64 Second, the Court didn't inquire into the
58 The Wheland Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 814, 819 (1958). Even allowing for a "wide range of
reasonableness" for the union here, it should be noted how closely the Court in Ford
Motor Co. analyzed the policy of granting veterans additional seniority in contrast to the
total lack of discussion in Wheland as to why ordnance employees should get any pref-
erence.
59 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
60 Moore v. Teamsters Local 89, 356 S.W.2d 241, 244 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962). Out of the
first 200 men hired, only 58 had worked for Dealers. This meant that 96 Dealers em-
ployees were laid off.
61 375 U.S. at 347.
62 Id. at 348.
63 Id. at 350.
64 Analysis of the merits of dovetailing of the sort undertaken in In re City of Green
Bay, 44 Lab. Arb. 811 (1965), was notably absent in the opinion. In addition, Mr. Justice
White, 375 U.S. at 347 n.10, quoted Kahn out of context. The full quote should read:
"Work opportunities should be allocated between the two employee groups in propor-
tion to the contribution made to the joint operation by their respective original em-
ployers. Integration of seniority lists should ordinarily be accomplished on the basis of
each employee's length of service with his original employer...." Kahn, Seniority Prob-
lems in Business Mergers, 8 IND. & LAn. RL. REv. 361, 378 (1955). Mr. Justice White
cited only the last sentence to support dovetailing. What Kahn, in fact, had in mind
was a two-step procedure: first, divide the remaining jobs between the two groups of
employees in proportion to job opportunities created by each of their respective em-
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motives of the union in choosing dovetailing. Why did the union favor
dovetailing? Did EgcL's employees want dovetailing because it was an
"equitable solution" or because it gave them more jobs? In fact, in this
merger the union could probably have chosen any number of solutions
with equal impunity.65
The key to the Court's opinion is, however, that since the union ex-
hibited no bad faith, it became unnecessary to grapple with the equities
of dovetailing.66 Whether the union here exhibited bad faith is an
arguable matter,67 but as in Wheland, scant attention was paid to the
solution, the Court instead concerning itself with form.
Truck Drivers Local 568 v. NLRB68 would appear, on its face, to
strengthen the duty of fair representation. The case arose when Red
Ball Motor Freight, Inc., with fifty employees represented by the Union
of Transportation Employees (UTE), acquired another trucking firm in
Shreveport, Louisiana, with about thirty workers represented by the
Teamsters. The company decided to combine the two groups of workers
in one terminal and reached an agreement with the two unions that it
would initiate representation proceedings to determine which of the
two would become the exclusive bargaining agent. During the cam-
paign, the UTE represented that it would never agree to dovetailing
ployers; second, with the employees now selected to fill the remaining jobs, integrate the
seniority lists, using the date of original hire. For a full discussion of this issue, see notes
96-109 and accompanying text infra.
105 See notes 31-33 supra. Bieski v. Eastern Automobile Forwarding Co., 231 F. Supp.
710 (D. Del. 1964), provides an interesting contrast in a similar fact situation. Two
companies delivered Chrysler cars to an allocated area, but because of competition from
the railroads, one was unable to make a profit and sold out to the other. The local
president suggested that the seniority lists be dovetailed, but the employees of the ab-
sorbing company rejected this solution. At the joint employer-employee committee, a
decision was reached that the absorbed company's employees had no contractual rights
to claim seniority with the absorbing company, and the absorbed employees were end-
tailed. That decision was upheld by the district court and affirmed by the Third Circuit.
354 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1965).
66 In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967), the Court said: "A breach of the statutory
duty of fair representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of
the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. See Humphrey
v. Moore .... " Thus, without a showing of bad faith, the Court will not review the
reasonableness of the decision,
67 See R. & E. JAMES, HOFFA AND Tm TE.AmSE s 167-185 (1965). This book gives a
very thorough analysis of the grievance procedure used by the Teamsters in the central
states, the same operating in Humphrey v. Moore. Because there is no arbitration as a
final step in the grievance procedure, the Teamster agreement in the central states does
not have a "no strike" clause. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
This gave Hoffa an opportunity to manipulate the grievance system so as to strengthen
the Teamsters' power both in organizing and at the bargaining table. It is doubtful that
any grievance settlement made under this procedure fulfilled the union's duty of fair
representation.
68 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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seniority lists and that UTE members' seniority would be protected
against that of the Teamsters. Two elections were held, both won nar-
rowly by the UTE and both set aside because of unfair labor charges
against the union.69
The NLRB found that in threatening to take action against the
Teamsters, if elected, upon "irrelevant, invidious or unfair" consider-
ations, the UTE breached its duty of fair representation under section
8(b)(1)(A), 70 as enunciated in Miranda Fuel Co. 7 1 Although the NLRB
toyed with the question of substance, i.e., that dovetaiing would be
reasonable and endtailing not, it rested its finding of a violation on the
"affirmative evidence to support the conclusion that the action which
UTE proposed was in derogation of its obligation of fair representa-
tion."72 It rested its conclusion on the inference "that UTE's promise
to seek preferential seniority for the UTE employees was based on its
desire to assure [its election] and was not conscientiously adopted
in an effort to find a workable solution to an admittedly difficult
problem." 73
The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed,74 basing its decision, like
the Board's, primarily on the bad faith conduct of the union. "It is not
our function to prefer one [method of integration] as against any
other," the court said. "But it seems dear.., that UTE has renounced
any good faith effort to reconcile the interests of the [two groups]."75
The union's campaign against dovetailing was found to be based not on
a consideration of the merits, 76 but solely on its desire to get elected.
Because of the UTE's overt discrimination, the outcome in Truck
Drivers Local 568 was not surprising. But the holding is a narrow one;
in the absence of bad faith conduct, the UTE might very well have dis-
criminated as it pleased. Had the UTE won the election, held open
hearings, ponderously weighed the alternatives and then decided
against dovetailing (which was what it was going to do all along), the
court would probably not have intervened.77
69 Both the NLRB and the court of appeals found the employer violated sections
8(a)(1) and (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l)-(2), but such
findings are irrelevant to this comment.
70 Section 8(b)(1)(A) makes it a violation for the union to restrain or coerce employees
in their right to self organization.
71 See note 24 supra.
72 157 N.L.R.B. at 1245.
73 Id.
74 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
75 Id. at 143.
76 The court mentioned two arguments against dovetailing: first, the difficulty of the
jobs performed in the new terminal; and second, that the absorbed firm was going out
of business and, but for the merger, its employees would have lost their jobs. 379 F.2d
at 142. Neither argument applies in this case.
77 See notes 32 & 65 supra.
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All four decisions discussed above demonstrate the refusal of the
courts to analyze the solutions which the various unions reached. None,
with the possible exception of Truck Drivers Local 568, fully takes
note of the tensions that underlie the situation. Only in Truck Drivers
Local 568 is a violation found, and then not because the solution was
substantively so extraordinary, but because the court viewed it as part
of a scheme to discriminate against one set of employees. This leads to
the conclusion that unless the union's bad faith conduct is blatant, as in
Truck Drivers Local 568, the duty of fair representation puts very little
restraint on the union. This conclusion is strengthened by the courts'
emphasis on procedure rather than substance. In effect, this triumph of
form over substance, coupled with a policy of non-intervention, keeps
the courts on the periphery of the problem-how the union reached the
solution-rather than at its center-the solution itself.
At the heart of this judicial attitude of non-intervention are three
considerations. First, as a general rule, courts should be wary of enter-
taining suits by individuals challenging the appropriateness of union
decisions at the bargaining table. For if every agreement were subject
to the dose scrutiny of the courts, the underpinnings, indeed the suc-
cess, of a national labor policy of promoting settlement of industrial
conflict by the parties concerned would be undermined.78 Underlying
the broad powers accorded the union in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman
is the Court's assumption that peaceful and stable labor relations will
be encouraged if the union has the power to bind its members when it
reaches agreement with the employer through collective bargaining.
Court decisions second-guessing the union or limiting its powers would
disrupt this relationship.79 Thus, in Trailmobile, Wheland and
Humphrey, the union is given a wide range of discretion to merge
seniority lists.so
Instead of involving the interplay between union and management,
however, the integration of seniority lists is generally considered by
78 "The collective bargaining system as encouraged by Congress and administered by
the NLRB of necessity subordinates the interests of an individual employee to the col-
lective interests of all employees in a bargaining unit." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182
(1967).
79 The Court recognized this in Vaca v. Sipes when it ruled that arbitrariness or bad
faith must be shown to void a union's decision to settle a grievance short of arbitra-
tion: "If the individual employee could compel arbitration of his grievance regardless
of its merit, the settlement machinery provided by the contract would be substantially
undermined, thus destroying the employer's confidence in the union's authority and
returning the individual grievant to the vagaries of independent and unsystematic ne-
gotiation." Id. at 191.
80 Note particularly Mr. Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Humphrey v. Moore,
375 U.S. 335, 351 (1964), which would give the union and the employer a free hand in
altering or modifying the contract.
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employers to be an internal union matter.8' And although courts have
often considered internal union matters beyond their reach, it seems
clear that when dealing with the duty of fair representation this is no
longer so.82 Moreover, the solution to the problem of integrating se-
niority lists involves neither the temporary compromises looking toward
long run advantages that Ford Motor Co.8 3 talked about, nor the con-
tinuing problem of choosing among grievances to go to arbitration that
was the crux of the matter in Vaca v. Sipes,84 but is generally resolved
only once in a bargaining relationship.85 And while not interfering with
the union-management relationship, closer judicial scrutiny of merged
seniority lists would strengthen a policy of protection to individual
workers articulated by courts,8 6 statutes,8 7 and commentators.88
A second related reason for judicial passivity is hesitance to interfere
with the inteinal politics of a union. The union serves, in part, as a
mediating agency, resolving the conflicting claims of its internal groups.
The struggle between skilled and semi-skilled groups within a given
local or international is an old story. 9 In seniority matters, competing
groups vie for a structure that might, for example, allow older workers
81 See Kahn, supra note 64, at 362. See also note 11 supra.
82 "[L]abor . . . unions which may be chosen as bargaining agents are regarded as
voluntary and not governmental in character, and not subject to judicial interference in
their internal affairs so long as they fairly represent all of the employees within the
class . . . ." Courant v. International Photographers of Motion Picture Industry Local
659, 176 F.2d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 943 (1950).
It is also significant that there has been a change in mood in Congress, which originally
saw labor relations as the conflict between union and management and the need for in-
dustrial peace. See Findings and Policies of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141 et seq. (1964). Recently, Congress has become concerned with individual members'
rights and the need to protect the individual worker against his union. See Declarations
of Findings, Purposes and Policy, Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, 73 Stat. 519 (Landrum-Griffin Act).
83 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
84 386 U.S. 171, 190-93 (1967).
85 Cf. Belanger v. Amalgamated Motor Coach Employees Local 1128, 254 Wis. 344, 36
N.W.2d 414 (1949).
86 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967), sees the duty of fair representation "as a
bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals stripped of traditional
forms of redress by the provisions of the federal labor law." See note 13 supra.
87 Section 101 of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1964), provides for a bill
of rights for members of labor organizations. The duty of fair representation has been
read into both the Railway Labor Act (Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S.
192 (1944)) and the National Labor Relations Act (Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350
U.S. 892, rev'g mem., 223 F.2d 789 (1955)).
88 Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Ju-
dicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 Mien. L. REv. 1435, 1464-1526 (1963);
Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HAsv. L. REv. 601, 630-38 (1956); Hanslowe,
Individual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 25, 43-55 (1959); Wel-
lington, supra note 34, at 1331-43.
89 Sayles, Seniority: An Internal Union Problem, 32 HARv. Bus. REv. 55 (1952).
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to avoid unpleasant tasks or give younger workers a better chance for
promotion.90 Unions, as democratic institutions, must allow some lee-
way for the majority to have its way. Although political factors may
operate in all seniority decisions, the merger situation appears to in-
volve important differences in degree that warrant imposing external
limits on such factors. As the discussed cases reveal, the relative political
power of the two groups of workers in the merger setting usually be-
comes the sole, or at least, the dominant consideration in merging se-
niority lists. It is this use of raw political power, coupled with the
importance of the decision-whether a substantial number of em-
ployees will keep their jobs-which, in the light of the duty of fair
representation, far outweighs the court's reluctance to upset the
union's political machinery.
The third consideration that has led to a policy of non-intervention
is the inability of courts to fashion a standard to judge the substantive
fairness of merged seniority lists.91 It was enough then in Trailmobile
for the solution "to forestall a strike,"92 and in Humphrey for it to be
"rational."03 In Truck Drivers Local 568, the court used no standard
at all: "It is not our function," the court said, "to prefer one [method
of integration] as against any other. "9 4 What is needed, then, is some
test by which the courts could judge the substantive fairness of the
union's decision without relying solely on a strict bad faith conduct
test. Most important, this standard should be one that conforms to the
economic rationale behind seniority, getting away from the present
emphasis on political considerations.95 It is to such a standard we now
turn.
A THEORY OF SENIORFIY
Seniority rights depend upon an employer-employee relationship;
they do not guarantee such a relationship but merely define the rights
of an employee when that status is in existence.-9 These rights, under
competitive status seniority, concern preference for jobs. And being
contractual, this preference is defined by the bounds of the collective
90 See id. at 55-61.
91 "What is clear is that courts have not found it easy to devise standards which are
institutionally sound in this esoteric world of collective bargaining. More often than not,
this difficulty has been recognized and has tended to restrain judicial intervention."
Wellington, supra note 34, at 1341.
92 179 F.2d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 1950).
93 875 U.S. 835, 347 (1964).
94379 F.2d 137, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
95 A solution calling for mandatory dovetailing, for example, would completely remove
any political considerations by a union, but would be incompatible with an understand-
ing of the concept of seniority. See notes 103-105 and accompanying text supra.
98 1AM Local 2040 v. Servel, Inc., 268 F.2d 692, 698 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 861 U.S.
884 (1959).
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bargaining agreement. The importance of seniority is the ability of one
worker in the seniority unit to claim a job over another within that
same group. Absolute lengths of time are only relevant in reference to
the relative number of years other workers within the same group
have. 7 To say that a worker has twenty years' seniority is meaningless
until it is known whether this is more or less than everyone else in his
group. Moreover, to acquire this seniority in a particular unit, individ-
ual workers may have, among other things, taken lower wages,98 given
up labor force mobility,90 or refrained from punching a supervisor in
the nose. 00
Seniority not only governs the competition for jobs within the unit,
but also acts as a buffer against workers outside the unit. What happens
if an employee of B, who has worked in a similar industry for more
years than half of A's employees, is laid off and now applies for a job
at A? He says that he should get a job at A since he has more seniority
than half of A's employees. But he doesn't because he has not acquired
seniority at Company A; he has done nothing to give him a preference
to job rights or opportunities at A.
Suppose that, because of increased competition from the railroads,
trucking firm A with 100 workers on 100 routes merges with trucking
firm B with 200 workers and 200 routes.1 1 The merged firm will have
only 200 routes-75 from A and 125 from B; and only 200 workers are
needed. Who loses his job? Union B wins the representation election
and decides to endtail. Without a showing of bad faith conduct by
Union B, the decision whereby 200 of B's employees and none of A's
would get jobs would probably be upheld in court. 02
Similarly, what would happen if Union B, three-quarters of whose
members have worked longer than A's, decides to dovetail the seniority
lists, thereby apportioning about 150 jobs to B's employees and 50 for
A's? Absent a showing of bad faith conduct by the union, precedent
would permit approval of the scheme.103
97 This, of course, would not be true if there were industry-wide seniority. The prob-
lem that this comment addresses itself to, however, would be obviated in such circum-
stances because there would be no need to integrate seniority lists.
98 Dooley v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 130 N.J. Eq. 75, 79, 21 A.2d 334, 338 (1941); N.
CaA*AmEIAIN, LABoR 270 (1958).
99 N. CHAxmmAwIN, LABOR 269-73 (1958).
100 Ross, The Arbitration of Discharge Cases: What Happens After Reinstatement,
CrmcAL IssuEs iN LABOR AR.rrRaTrON 29 (McKelvey ed. 1957).
101 This is similar to the situation in Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), and
Bieski v. Eastern Auto Forwarding Co., 231 F. Supp. 710 (D. Del. 1964), afftd, 354 F.2d
414 (3d Cir. 1965).
102 See note 32 supra.
103 See note 31 supra. But see criticism of dovetailing in Kennedy, Merging Seniority
Lists, LABOR ARBITRATioN AND INDusrRLAL CHANGE 55 (1963) (Proceedings of the Sixteenth
Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators).
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In both situations, Company B's employees are gaining a windfall-
getting jobs which, but for the merger, belonged to Company A's em-
ployees. If Company B's employees had no seniority claims with respect
to job opportunities when A and B were separate entities, why should
they now that A and B are one? Surely, the seniority acquired by B's
employees in respect to Company B has no relevance to that acquired
by A's employees in respect to Company A. To allow B's employees to
claim jobs that once belonged to A's employees is to say, as did Justices
Frankfurter and Jackson in their Trailmobile dissent, that the seniority
rights of the minority group "were simply misappropriated to the
benefit of the majority group."104
Further, if an employee of B is laid off, i.e., his seniority at B is in-
sufficient for him to claim a job, he can make no claim on a job at Com-
pany A. Yet, in dovetailing a seniority list, the number of years he has
worked for B becomes very relevant in competing for a job that was
created at A. The inconsistency reflects a misunderstanding of the
nature of seniority rights-viewing seniority solely in terms of number
of years rather than as job preference within a particular group. 05
Do business mergers have any effect on this analysis of seniority? It
seems clear that merger decisions are not made with reference to the
seniority rights of either group of employees.10 6 As one arbitrator has
put it: "Financial or tax advantages, or perhaps legal considerations
may be weighed, but so far as the employees are concerned, it is sheer
happenstance whether Company A or Company B survives in its
original legal form. '" 107
STRUcrURING A SOLUTION-THE CONTRIBUTION FORMULA
To lump all the employees of both companies together and treat the
merged company as a new entity for seniority purposes is to obscure
the fact that the new whole is created by the contribution made by each
of the two previously distinct companies. That the merger may generate
104 See note 42 supra.
105 "A seniority list is not literally or necessarily a list determined by time itself. It
is rather a list which reflects the priority [of] job rights and opportunities of employees
as among themselves which the employer agrees to respect." In re Pan American World
Airways, 19 Lab. Arb. 14, 17 (1952) (Cole, Arbitrator).
106 "Employees, and the union which represents them, ordinarily do not take part in
negotiations leading to a change in corporate ownership. The negotiations will ordinarily
not concern the well-being of the employees, whose advantage or disadvantage, poten-
tially great, will inevitably be incidental to the main considerations." John Wiley &
Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964).
107 In re Pan American World Airways, Inc., 19 Lab. Arb. 14, 19 (1952) (Cole, Arbitra-
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new jobs does not alter the fact that there is a contribution by each
firm to total employment.108
This notion of relative contribution is crucial to a rational and equi-
table approach to merging seniority lists. By allocating jobs between
the two groups of employees on the basis of the ratio of job opportu-
nities provided by their former employers, 109 neither group can gain a
windfall at the expense of the other. Further, by inquiring not into the
number of years worked but rather into a worker's priority of job
preference within a particular group, this method is consistent with
the theory of seniority discussed above. Commentators and arbitrators
have seen the contribution formula as the soundest and most equitable
way to eliminate political considerations.".0
That the contribution formula is the most equitable and rational
standard by which a court can judge the substantive fairness of a merger
of seniority lists should not conceal the fact that other criteria may have
some importance. Given two companies with labor forces having rela-
tively equal distribution of years in service and no reduction in the
number of employees to be used, dovetailing could roughly balance
the interests of the two groups."' Laying off married women during an
economic decline so as to increase the likelihood that there will be a
breadwinner in every family is a consideration," 2 as is protecting union
officials against dismissal"13 and considering special job experience."14
In each instance the court must inquire into the reasonableness of
the determination: whether the criteria used by the union to calculate
108 See Kahn, supra note 64, at 372.
109 Within each group, the former seniority list will govern. In order to apportion the
risk of layoff fairly between the two groups, the list must be integrated to reflect the
ratio of job opportunities. Thus, if A contributes two-thirds of the jobs and B one-
third, every third name on the list should be an employee of B.
It has been suggested that once the ratio is calculated and those employees chosen, then
the list should be integrated using length of service solely. See note 64 supra. The prob-
lem with this suggestion is that it puts the burden of the risk of layoff on the men with
less seniority (in absolute terms), regardless of what their priority in job preference was
before the merger.
1lo See In re Sonotone Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 359, 364 (1964) (Wolf, Arbitrator); In re
Pan American World Airways Inc., 19 Lab. Arb. 14, 18 (1952) (Cole, Arbitrator); Kahn,
supra note 64 at 371-74; Kennedy, supra note 103, at 17-22.
111 In re City of Green Bay, 44 Lab. Arb. 811 (1965) (Anderson, Arbitrator).
112 Hartley v. Brotherhood of R.R. & S.S. Clerks, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885 (1936).
But see title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a). Section 703(a)
provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer---(1) ... to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of such
individual's ... sex .... "
113 Aeronautical Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521 (1949).
114 Outland v. CAB, 284 F.2d 224, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See Kennedy, supra note 103,
at 32-34.
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the contribution formula are reasonable in relation to that particular
industry,115 and whether any deviations from this formula can be justi-
fied, such as those set out above.
Clearly, the basis for measuring the previous contribution of each
employer varies with the occupation involved.11 6 In the railroad in-
dustry, for example, where the contribution formula is utilized, dif-
ferent criteria are used depending on the group affected. 117 The Order
of Railway Conductors and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
both prescribe that the runs in a merged operation will be manned in
proportion to the mileage run on the territory of each of the original
roads.118 The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen relies upon "engine
hours worked by the respective lines" in the respective yards when
these are to be merged in connection with the services of yardmen."19
In considering the shape of litigation, it should be the plaintiff's
burden to prove the unreasonableness of the criteria selected in con-
structing the contribution formula. 20 As to deviations from the
formula itself, the burden should fall to the union to show the reason-
ableness of any deviations. 121 Whatever the burdens, the task of the
court is central in judging the scope of reasonableness accorded to the
union. The contribution formula itself does not eliminate political
considerations, for the union will, to some extent, be allowed to choose
the criteria and the weight accorded to each. At least, the fear that it
may have to go into court and establish the reasonableness of its deter-
mination, whereas previously it didn't unless bad faith conduct was
present, will have a dampening effect on the union and eliminate bla-
tantly discriminatory solutions such as were reached in Trailmobile and
Wheland. In addition, if it is assumed that the union leadership wants
to live up to the duty of fair representation and only creates discrimina-
tory solutions in response to the majority, the presence of the contribu-
tion formula may have an educative effect. It enables the union
115 The court must ascertain whether the union, in using the criteria, also calculated
the formula correctly. In addition to this requirement of reasonableness, the good faith
requirement is retained. Thus a formula would be invalid if, in spite of the reasonable-
ness of the criteria used, the criteria selected were chosen so as to discriminate against one
group, for example, all Negroes involved.
116 Kahn, supra note 64, at 371.
117 Id. at 371-73.
118 Id. at 371.
119 Id.
120 In setting up a standard, one has to balance between the fear of a great many
harassment suits and setting up a standard so broad as to make the plaintiff's case as
difficult as it is under the present bad faith test. This balancing is achieved by having
plaintiff prove the unreasonableness of the criteria used, but by having the union show
the reasonableness of any deviation from the contribution formula itself.
121 See note 120 supra.
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leadership to justify its actions to its members on the grounds that it
must comply with its legal duty of fair representation.
The courts have a crucial role in putting meaning into a flexible
standard of reasonableness; too lax a standard may leave the individual
in a position where he is not much better off than he is today. The
function of the court, then, is to create law, finding guides in the in-
dustrial world and the moral precepts of the community-a task, as one
observer sees it, "no more nor less difficult than in situations where the
common law judge is required to particularize some general rule of
reasonableness."' 22
As can readily be surmised, the difficulty with the formula lies in
calculating the contribution of the respective parties.123 The difficulty
varies with the nature of the merger.124 If A produces widgets and B
produces hula hoops and now AB produces transistor radios, the
problems involved in calculating the individual firm's contribution are
substantial. The more homogenous the merging firms are, however,
the easier the calculation. Given the proliferation of mergers in the
transportation industry,125 for example, and the seniority disputes gen-
erated by them, 26 the heterogeneity problem in calculating the con-
tribution formula is not as great as it might appear.
CONCLUSION
Seniority defines the order of claims to a job opportunity within a
particular work unit. When seniority lists are merged, the nature of
seniority rights is often obscured, and sheer power usually prevails in
reaching a method of integration.
By turning to the contribution formula, courts will be better
equipped to judge the substantive fairness of a union's solution rather
than limiting their inquiry to the union's conduct in reaching the
122 Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REv. 601, 632 (1956).
123 Two other problems are present* when to integrate the list and what to do if
additional jobs are created by the merger. As to the first, integration should take place
whenever the employer requests, and the ratio of job opportunities should be calculated
at that time. If the employer moves from his position of neutrality (see note 11 supra)
and tries to time his request for integration so as to favor one union or the other, a
section 8(a)(1) or 8(a)(3) violation could be found. As to jobs that neither firm contributed
but were created because of the merger, they should be apportioned between the two
work forces on a 50-50 basis.
124 Kennedy, supra note 103, at 20-22.
125 Mater & Mangum, The Integration of Seniority Lists in Transportation Mergers,
16 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 343, 344 (1963).
126 Eg., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Hyland v. United Airlines, 254 F.
Supp. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1966); Fischer v. Guaranteed Concrete Co., 151 N.W.2d 266 (Minn.
1967).
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solution. The formula enables the courts and the NLRB127 to go beyond
what is, to the employees involved, the fringe issue of the union's good
or bad faith, and take up the central issue of who gets the jobs. Of equal
importance, the contribution formula is consistent with the economic
rationale behind seniority and shifts the focus away from political
considerations.
Appreciation of the inequities of judicial non-intervention in the
area of merging seniority lists and the availability of a practical, eco-
nomically-based formula should induce courts to put new meaning
into the duty of fair representation. The element of reasonableness
permits flexibility for the courts, so that they can police solutions
without demanding an abdication by the unions of their decision-
making prerogatives. The contribution formula is sufficiently precise
to fully involve the courts in the problem and effectively discourage the
self-serving solutions of the majority.
127 All that has been said about the courts in this comment applies generally also to
the NLRB. The Board, however, has pursued a more vigorous policy of intervention than
have the courts and has been far more cognizant of the underlying tensions. See The
Trailer Co. of America, 51 N.L.R.B. 1106, 1114 (1943); The Wheland Co., 120 N.L.R.B.
814 (1958). In all probability, a plaintiff would have an easier time proving a violation
of the duty of fair representation before the Board than in court.
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